In the Reading From Plato's Republic, Glaucon Says That the Reason to Be Moral Is Because

March 02, 2022 Post a Comment

Plato: The Republic

Plato Since the mid-nineteenth century, the Democracy has been Plato'southward most famous and widely read dialogue. Equally in most other Platonic dialogues the primary character is Socrates. It is generally accepted that the Commonwealth belongs to the dialogues of Plato'south heart period. In Plato's early dialogues, Socrates refutes the accounts of his interlocutors and the discussion ends with no satisfactory reply to the matter investigated. In the Republic however, we come across Socrates developing a position on justice and its relation to eudaimonia (happiness). He provides a long and complicated, but unified argument, in defense force of the just life and its necessary connection to the happy life.

The dialogue explores two central questions. The start question is "what is justice?" Socrates addresses this question both in terms of political communities and in terms of the individual person or soul. He does this to accost the second and driving question of the dialogue: "is the just person happier than the unjust person?" or "what is the relation of justice to happiness?" Given the two key questions of the discussion, Plato's philosophical concerns in the dialogue are upstanding and political. In order to address these two questions, Socrates and his interlocutors construct a just city in speech communication, the Kallipolis. They practice this in gild to explicate what justice is and so they proceed to illustrate justice by analogy in the homo soul. On the way to defending the just life, Socrates considers a tremendous variety of subjects such as several rival theories of justice, competing views of human happiness, pedagogy, the nature and importance of philosophy and philosophers, knowledge, the structure of reality, the Forms, the virtues and vices, good and bad souls, proficient and bad political regimes, the family, the function of women in guild, the office of art in society, and even the afterlife. This wide scope of the dialogue presents various interpretative difficulties and has resulted in thousands of scholarly works. In club to attempt to understand the dialogue's statement as a whole i is required to grapple with these subjects.

Synopsis of the Republic
1. Book I
2. Book Ii
3. Volume III
4. Volume IV
5. Volume V
6. Book Six
7. Book VII
8. Book VIII
9. Book 9
10. Book 10
Ideals or Political Philosophy?
The Analogy of the City and the Soul
Plato's Defense of Justice
References and Further Reading
1. Standard Greek Text
2. English Translations
3. General Discussions of the Commonwealth
4. Discussions on Plato's Ethics and Political Philosophy
5. Discussions on the City/Soul Analogy.
6. Discussions of Plato's Defense of Justice in the Republic
7. Discussions of Political Measures Introduced in the Just City
  1. Discussions of the Function of Women in the Only City
  2. Discussions of Poetry in the Just Metropolis
  3. Discussions on the Soul in the Republic
  4. Discussions on Plato's Moral Psychology in the Republic

1. Synopsis of the Republic

a. Book I

Socrates and Glaucon visit the Piraeus to attend a festival in honor of the Thracian goddess Bendis (327a). They are led to Polemarchus' house (328b). Socrates speaks to Cephalus about former historic period, the benefits of being wealthy, and justice (328e-331d). Ane would not claim that it is just to return weapons one owes to a mad friend (331c), thus justice is not being truthful and returning what one owes every bit Cephalus claims. The give-and-take between Socrates and Polemarchus follows (331d-336b).

Polemarchus claims that justice is helping one's friends and harming ane'due south enemies and that this is what 1 owes people (332c). Socrates' objections to Polemarchus' definition are as follows: (i) Is this appropriate in medicine or cooking? So in what context is this the case? (332d)? (ii) The simply person will as well be adept at useless things and at being unjust (333e). (iii) We frequently do not know who our friends and enemies are. Thus, nosotros may treat those whom nosotros only think are our friends or enemies well or desperately. Would this be justice? (334c). (iv) It does not seem to be just to treat anyone badly, not even an enemy (335b). Discussion betwixt Socrates and Thrasymachus follows (336b-354c).

Thrasymachus defines justice equally the advantage or what is beneficial to the stronger (338c). Justice is dissimilar nether different political regimes according to the laws, which are made to serve the interests of the strong (the ruling class in each regime, 338e-339a). Socrates requires clarification of the definition: does it mean that justice is what the stronger think is benign to them or what is actually beneficial to them (339b)? And don't the strong rulers make mistakes and sometimes create laws that practice not serve their reward (339c)? Thrasymachus points out that the stronger are actually but those who do non make mistakes as to what is to their advantage (340d). Socrates responds with a discussion of art or craft and points out that its aim is to do what is good for its subjects, not what is good for the practitioner (341c). Thrasymachus suggests that some arts, such as that of shepherds, do not practise this just rather aim at the reward of the practitioner (343c). He also adds the merits that injustice is in every way better than justice and that the unjust person who commits injustice undetected is always happier than the just person (343e-344c). The paradigm of the happy unjust person is the tyrant who is able to satisfy all his desires (344a-b). Socrates points out that the shepherd's business organization for his sheep is different from his concern to make money, which is extraneous to the art (345c) and that no power or art provides what is beneficial to itself (346e). Socrates claims that the all-time rulers are reluctant to rule simply exercise then out of necessity: they do non wish to be ruled by someone inferior (347a-c).

Socrates offers three argument in favor of the just life over the unjust life: (i) the just man is wise and good, and the unjust man is ignorant and bad (349b); (ii) injustice produces internal disharmony which prevents effective actions (351b); (iii) virtue is excellence at a thing's function and the merely person lives a happier life than the unjust person, since he performs the diverse functions of the human soul well (352d). Socrates is dissatisfied with the discussion since an acceptable account of justice is necessary before they tin can address whether the just life is better than the unjust life (354b).

b. Volume II

Glaucon is non persuaded by the arguments in the previous word (357a). He divides good things into three classes: things adept in themselves, things good both in themselves and for their consequences, and things good only for their consequences (357b-d). Socrates places justice in the class of things practiced in themselves and for their consequences.

Glaucon renews Thrasymachus' argument to challenge Socrates to defend justice past itself without any consideration of what comes from it (358b ff.). Glaucon gives a speech defending injustice: (i) justice originates as a compromise between weak people who are afraid that suffering injustice is worse than doing it (358e-359a); (two) people human action justly because this is necessary and unavoidable, and so justice is expert only for its consequences (story of the ring of Gyges' ancestor, 359c-360d); (iii) the unjust person with the reputation for justice is happier than the just person with the reputation for injustice (360d-362c).

Adeimantus expands Glaucon's defense of injustice and assail on justice by asserting: the reputation of justice is better than justice itself, so the unjust person who is able to go on the reputation of being just will exist happier than the just person; discussion of various ways that the unjust tin larn the reputation for justice (362d-366d).

Socrates is asked to defend justice for itself, non for the reputation information technology allows for (367b). He proposes to look for justice in the city first so to continue by analogy to detect justice in the individual (368c-369a). This approach will allow for a clearer judgment on the question of whether the only person is happier than the unjust person. Socrates begins by discussing the origins of political life and constructs a just city in spoken language that satisfies only basic human necessities (369b-372c). Socrates argues that humans enter political life since each is not self-sufficient by nature. Each human has certain natural abilities (370a) and doing just the single task one is naturally suited for, is the most efficient way to satisfy the needs of all the citizens (370c). Glaucon objects that Socrates' city is too elementary and calls it "a metropolis of pigs" (372d). Socrates describes a city that allows for luxuries ("a feverish city," 372e-373e). Socrates points out that the luxurious city will crave an ground forces to guard the metropolis (373e). The army will be equanimous of professional soldiers, the guardians, who, like dogs, must be gentle to fellow citizens and harsh to enemies (375c). The guardians need to exist educated very carefully to be able to practise their job of protecting the metropolis's citizens, laws, and customs well (376d). Poetry and stories need to exist censored to guarantee such an instruction (377b). Poetry should: (i) nowadays the gods equally good and only every bit causes of good (379a); (ii) equally unchanging in class (380d); (iii) as beings who refrain from lies and deception (381e).

c. Book III

Socrates continues the political measures of the censorship of poetry: (iv) the underworld should not exist portrayed as a bad place so that the guardians will not be too agape of death (386b); (v) the heroes and gods should non be presented lamenting so that the guardians tin develop backbone (387e); (6) poesy should forestall people from laughing violently (388e); (seven) poetry should promote the guardian's sense of truth-telling but with the willingness to lie when this is conducive to the good of the urban center (389b); (viii) information technology should promote self-discipline and obedience (389c-d); (ix) it should non include stories that contribute to avarice (390d); (ten) it should not include stories that contribute to hubris or impiety (391a). Socrates moves on to hash out the manner in which stories should be told (392d). He divides such manners into elementary narration (in 3rd person) and imitative narration (in first person, 392d). To keep the guardians doing just their job, Socrates argues that the guardians may imitate but what is appropriate for this (394e-395d). The merely city should allow only modes and rhythms that fit the content of poetry allowed in the just metropolis (398b-399c). Socrates explains how skillful art can lead to the formation of good character and make people more likely to follow their reason (400e-402c). Socrates turns to the concrete education of the guardians and says that it should include concrete grooming that prepares them for war, a careful diet, and habits that contribute to the avoidance of doctors (403c-405b). Concrete education should be geared to benefit the soul rather than the body, since the body necessarily benefits when the soul is in a good status, whereas the soul does not necessarily benefit when the torso is in a good condition (410b-c).

Socrates begins to describe how the rulers of the just urban center are to be selected from the grade of the guardians: they need to be older, strong, wise, and wholly unwilling to exercise anything other than what is advantageous to the city (412b-414b). Socrates suggests that they need to tell the citizens a myth that should be believed by subsequent generations in guild for everyone to take his position in the city (414b-415d). The myth of metals portrays each human being as having a precious metallic in them: those naturally suited to be rulers have golden, those suited to exist guardians have silver, and those suited for farming and the other crafts have bronze.

Socrates gain to discuss the living and housing atmospheric condition of the guardians: they will non have private holding, they will have footling privacy, they volition receive what they need from the city via revenue enhancement of the other classes, and they will live communally and take common messes (415e-416e).

d. Volume 4

Adeimantus complains that the guardians in the just urban center volition not be very happy (419a). Socrates points out that the aim is to make the whole city, and not whatever particular grade, as happy as possible (420b). Socrates discusses several other measures for the city equally a whole in order to reach this. At that place should be neither also much wealth nor too much poverty in the city since these cause social strife (421d-422a). The just city should be only as large in size as would let it to be unified and stable (423b). Socrates reemphasizes the importance of the guardian's teaching and suggests that the guardians will possess wives and children in common (423e). He suggests that they should only let very limited ways by which innovations may be introduced to education or change in the laws (424b-425e). The merely city will follow traditional Greek religious customs (427b).

With the founding of the just city completed, Socrates proceeds to discuss justice (427d). He claims that the city they take founded is completely good and virtuous and thus it is wise, courageous, moderate, and just (427e). Justice will exist what remains once they find the other 3 virtues in information technology, namely wisdom, courage, and moderation (428a). The wisdom of the just city is establish in its rulers and information technology is the blazon of knowledge that allows them to dominion the city well (428b-d). The courage of the only city is constitute in its military and it is correct and lawful conventionalities about what to fright and what not to fear (429a-430b). The city'southward moderation or cocky-discipline is its unanimity in following the just metropolis's construction in terms of who should dominion and who should be ruled (430d-432a). The city's justice consists in each class performing its proper function (433a-b).

Socrates and then proceeds to find the corresponding four virtues in the individual (434d). Socrates defends the analogy of the city and the individual (435a-b) and proceeds to distinguish three analogous parts in the soul with their natural functions (436b). By using instances of psychological conflict, he distinguishes the function of the rational office from that of the appetitive role of the soul (439a). Then he distinguishes the function of the spirited part from the functions of the two other parts (439e-440e). The function of the rational part is thinking, that of the spirited function the experience of emotions, and that of the appetitive function the pursuit of actual desires. Socrates explains the virtues of the private'south soul and how they represent to the virtues of the city (441c-442d). Socrates points out that one is just when each of the three parts of the soul performs its part (442d). Justice is a natural rest of the soul'due south parts and injustice is an imbalance of the parts of the soul (444e). Socrates is now ready to answer the question of whether justice is more assisting than injustice that goes unpunished (444e-445a). To do so he will need to examine the diverse unjust political regimes and the corresponding unjust individuals in each (445c-e).

e. Book V

Socrates is about to embark on a discussion of the unjust political regimes and the corresponding unjust individuals when he is interrupted by Adeimantus and Polemarchus (449a-b). They insist that he needs to accost the comment he made earlier that the guardians will possess the women and the children of the city in common (449b-d). Socrates reluctantly agrees (450a-451b) and begins with the proffer that the guardian women should perform the aforementioned task equally the male guardians (451c-d). Some may follow convention and object that women should be given different jobs because they differ from men past nature (453a-c). Socrates responds by indicating that the natural differences between men and women are not relevant when it comes to the jobs of protecting and ruling the city. Both sexes are naturally suited for these tasks (454d-e). Socrates goes on to argue that the measure of allowing the women to perform the same tasks as the men in this fashion is not but viable but also best. This is the case since the most suited people for the job volition exist performing information technology (456c).

Socrates also proposes that in that location should be no split up families among the members of the guardian class: the guardians will possess all the women and children in common (457c-d). Socrates gain to discuss how this mensurate is for the all-time and Glaucon allows him to skip discussing its feasibility (458a-c). The best guardian men are to have sexual practice with the best guardian women to produce offspring of a similar nature (458d-459d). Socrates describes the system of eugenics in more than detail. In order to guarantee that the best guardian men have sex with the best guardian women, the urban center will accept wedlock festivals supported by a rigged lottery arrangement (459e-460a). The best guardian men will also be immune to have sexual activity with as many women equally they desire in order to increment the likelihood of giving birth to children with similar natures (460a-b). Once born, the children will be taken abroad to a rearing pen to be taken intendance of by nurses and the parents will not exist immune to know who their ain children are (460c-d). This is then that the parents recall of all the children as their own. Socrates recognizes that this system will consequence in members of the aforementioned family unit having intercourse with each other (461c-e).

Socrates gain to argue that these arrangements will ensure that unity spreads throughout the city (462a-465d). Responding to Adeimantus' earlier complaint that the guardians would not be happy, Socrates indicates that the guardians will be happy with their way of life; they will have their needs satisfied and volition receive sufficient award from the urban center (465d-eastward). Thereafter, Socrates discusses how the guardians will conduct war (466e).

Glaucon interrupts him and demands an business relationship explaining how such a just city can come into being (471c-e). Socrates admits that this is the most difficult criticism to address (472a). Then he explains that the theoretical model of the just city they synthetic remains valid for discussing justice and injustice fifty-fifty if they cannot prove that such a city tin can come up to exist (472b-473b). Socrates claims that the model of the just city cannot come into beingness until philosophers rule every bit kings or kings become philosophers (473c-d). He also points out that this is the just possible road by which to accomplish complete happiness in both public and private life (473e). Socrates indicates that they to, hash out philosophy and philosophers to justify these claims (474b-c). Philosophers honey and pursue all of wisdom (475b-c) and they especially love the sight of truth (475e). Philosophers are the only ones who recognize and find pleasure in what is backside the multiplicity of appearances, namely the unmarried Form (476a-b). Socrates distinguishes betwixt those who know the unmarried Forms that are and those who have opinions (476d). Those who take opinions exercise not know, since opinions have becoming and changing appearances every bit their object, whereas knowledge implies that the objects thereof are stable (476e-477e).

f. Book Half-dozen

Socrates goes on to explain why philosophers should rule the city. They should practise so since they are better able to know the truth and since they take the relevant applied knowledge by which to dominion. The philosopher'due south natural abilities and virtues prove that they take what is necessary to rule well: they love what is rather than what becomes (485a-b), they hate falsehood (485c), they are moderate (485d-e), they are courageous (486a-b), they are quick learners (486c), they have a good memory (486c-d), they like proportion since the truth is like it, and they have a pleasant nature (486d-487a).

Adeimantus objects that actual philosophers are either useless or bad people (487a-d). Socrates responds with the analogy of the ship of land to evidence that philosophers are falsely blamed for their uselessness (487e-489a). Like a doc who does non beg patients to heal them, the philosopher should not plead with people to rule them (489b-c). To the accusation that philosophers are bad, Socrates responds that those with the philosopher's natural abilities and with outstanding natures often get corrupted by a bad educational activity and go outstandingly bad (491b-e). Thus, someone can only be a philosopher in the true sense if he receives the proper kind of education. After a discussion of the sophists as bad teachers (492a-493c), Socrates warns confronting various people who falsely claim to exist philosophers (495b-c). Since electric current political regimes atomic number 82 to either the corruption or the destruction of the philosopher, he should avert politics and lead a repose private life (496c-d).

Socrates and then addresses the question of how philosophy can come up to play an of import role in existing cities (497e). Those with philosophical natures demand to do philosophy all their lives, especially when they are older (498a-c). The only way to make sure that philosophy is properly appreciated and does non meet hostility is to wipe an existing city clean and begin information technology anew (501a). Socrates concludes that the just urban center and the measures proposed are both for the best and not impossible to bring about (502c).

Socrates gain to discuss the education of philosopher kings (502c-d). The near important affair philosophers should written report is the Form of the Skilful (505a). Socrates considers several candidates for what the Good is, such as pleasure and noesis and he rejects them (505b-d). He points out that nosotros choose everything with a view to the expert (505e). Socrates attempts to explain what the Form of the Skilful is through the analogy of the sun (507c-509d). As the sun illuminates objects and then the heart can come across them, the Form of the Good renders the objects of cognition knowable to the human soul. As the sun provides things with their ability to be, to grow, and with nourishment, the Grade of the Skilful provides the objects of knowledge with their beingness even though it itself is higher than being (509b).

Socrates offers the illustration of the divided line to explain the Form of the Skillful even further (509d-511d). He divides a line into two unequal sections once and so into ii unequal sections once again. The lowest two parts represent the visible realm and the superlative two parts the intelligible realm. In the first of the four sections of the line, Socrates places images/shadows, in the second department visible objects, in the 3rd section truths arrived at via hypotheses as mathematicians do, and in the terminal section the Forms themselves. Respective to each of these, in that location is a capacity of the human soul: imagination, belief, thought, and agreement. The line also represents degrees of clarity and opacity as the lowest sections are more opaque and the higher sections clearer.

thou. Book Vii

Socrates continues his discussion of the philosopher and the Forms with a third analogy, the illustration of the cave (514a-517c). This represents the philosopher'southward didactics from ignorance to knowledge of the Forms. Truthful education is the turning around of the soul from shadows and visible objects to true understanding of the Forms (518c-d). Philosophers who achieve this understanding will be reluctant to do anything other than contemplate the Forms but they must exist forced to render to the cavern (the metropolis) and rule information technology.

Socrates proceeds to outline the structure of the philosopher male monarch'south instruction so that they can reach an understanding of the Forms (521d). Those who eventually become philosopher kings will initially exist educated like the other guardians in poesy, music, and concrete education (521d-e). Then they will receive pedagogy in mathematics: arithmetic and number (522c), aeroplane geometry (526c), and solid geometry (528b). Following these, they will study astronomy (528e), and harmonics (530d). Then they volition report dialectic which volition lead them to understand the Forms and the Grade of the Good (532a). Socrates gives a partial explanation of the nature of dialectic and leaves Glaucon with no clear caption of its nature or how it may atomic number 82 to understanding (532a-535a). Then they hash out who will receive this course of education and how long they are to study these subjects (535a-540b). The ones receiving this type of education need to exhibit the natural abilities suited to a philosopher discussed earlier. After the preparation in dialectic the didactics system will include fifteen years of practical political preparation (539e-540c) to set philosopher kings for ruling the city. Socrates concludes by suggesting that the easiest way to bring the only urban center into beingness would be to expel everyone over the age of ten out of an existing city (540e-541b).

h. Volume Viii

Socrates picks up the argument that was interrupted in Book V. Glaucon remembers that Socrates was about to describe the four types of unjust regime along with their respective unjust individuals (543c-544b). Socrates announces that he will begin discussing the regimes and individual that deviate the least from the just metropolis and individual and proceed to hash out the ones that deviate the virtually (545b-c). The crusade of alter in regime is lack of unity in the rulers (545d). Assuming that the just city could come into existence, Socrates indicates that it would eventually change since everything which comes into existence must decay (546a-b). The rulers are bound to make mistakes in assigning people jobs suited to their natural capacities and each of the classes will begin to be mixed with people who are not naturally suited for the tasks relevant to each form (546e). This volition lead to class conflicts (547a).

The first deviant regime from simply kingship or elite will be timocracy, that emphasizes the pursuit of honor rather than wisdom and justice (547d ff.). The timocratic individual will accept a potent spirited role in his soul and will pursue accolade, power, and success (549a). This city will exist militaristic. Socrates explains the procedure by which an private becomes timocratic: he listens to his mother complain about his father's lack of interest in accolade and success (549d). The timocratic private'southward soul is at a middle point between reason and spirit.

Oligarchy arises out of timocracy and it emphasizes wealth rather than honor (550c-e). Socrates discusses how it arises out of timocracy and its characteristics (551c-552e): people will pursue wealth; it will essentially be two cities, a city of wealthy citizens and a city of poor people; the few wealthy will fearfulness the many poor; people will do various jobs simultaneously; the city will allow for poor people without ways; it will have a high crime rate. The oligarchic private comes by seeing his father lose his possessions and feeling insecure he begins to greedily pursue wealth (553a-c). Thus he allows his appetitive part to go a more dominant part of his soul (553c). The oligarchic individual'due south soul is at middle signal between the spirited and the appetitive office.

Socrates proceeds penultimately, to hash out democracy. It comes about when the rich become too rich and the poor likewise poor (555c-d). Likewise much luxury makes the oligarchs soft and the poor defection confronting them (556c-e). In democracy most of the political offices are distributed by lot (557a). The master goal of the democratic regime is liberty or license (557b-c). People volition come to concur offices without having the necessary cognition (557e) and everyone is treated as an equal in ability (equals and unequals alike, 558c). The autonomous individual comes to pursue all sorts of bodily desires excessively (558d-559d) and allows his appetitive part to dominion his soul. He comes about when his bad education allows him to transition from desiring money to desiring bodily and textile appurtenances (559d-e). The democratic individual has no shame and no self-discipline (560d).

Tyranny arises out of democracy when the desire for liberty to do what one wants becomes farthermost (562b-c). The liberty or license aimed at in the democracy becomes so extreme that any limitations on anyone'south freedom seem unfair. Socrates points out that when freedom is taken to such an farthermost it produces its opposite, slavery (563e-564a). The tyrant comes about by presenting himself as a champion of the people against the class of the few people who are wealthy (565d-566a). The tyrant is forced to commit a number of acts to gain and retain power: accuse people falsely, assail his kinsmen, bring people to trial under imitation pretenses, impale many people, exile many people, and purport to abolish the debts of the poor to gain their support (565e-566a). The tyrant eliminates the rich, brave, and wise people in the city since he perceives them every bit threats to his power (567c). Socrates indicates that the tyrant faces the dilemma to either live with worthless people or with expert people who may eventually depose him and chooses to live with worthless people (567d). The tyrant ends up using mercenaries as his guards since he cannot trust any of the citizens (567d-e). The tyrant as well needs a very large army and volition spend the metropolis's money (568d-east), and will not hesitate to impale members of his own family if they resist his ways (569b-c).

i. Volume Nine

Socrates is now ready to talk over the tyrannical private (571a). He begins by discussing necessary and unnecessary pleasures and desires (571b-c). Those with balanced souls ruled by reason are able to keep their unnecessary desires from becoming lawless and extreme (571d-572b). The tyrannical individual comes out of the democratic individual when the latter's unnecessary desires and pleasures become farthermost; when he becomes full of Eros or lust (572c-573b). The tyrannical person is mad with lust (573c) and this leads him to seek any ways past which to satisfy his desires and to resist anyone who gets in his style (573d-574d). Some tyrannical individuals eventually go actual tyrants (575b-d). Tyrants associate themselves with flatterers and are incapable of friendship (575e-576a). Applying the analogy of the city and the soul, Socrates proceeds to argue that the tyrannical private is the nigh unhappy individual (576c ff.). Like the tyrannical city, the tyrannical individual is enslaved (577c-d), least likely to do what he wants (577d-e), poor and unsatisfiable (579e-578a), fearful and total of wailing and lamenting (578a). The individual who becomes an bodily tyrant of a city is the unhappiest of all (578b-580a). Socrates concludes this beginning argument with a ranking of the individuals in terms of happiness: the more just one is the happier (580b-c).

He proceeds to a 2d proof that the merely are happier than the unjust (580d). Socrates distinguishes three types of persons: one who pursues wisdom, another who pursues honor, and another who pursues profit (579d-581c). He argues that we should trust the wisdom lover'southward judgment in his way of life as the most pleasant, since he is able to consider all three types of life clearly (581c-583a).

Socrates proceeds to offer a 3rd proof that the just are happier than the unjust (583b). He begins with an analysis of pleasure: relief from pain may seem pleasant (583c) and actual pleasures are merely a relief from hurting but not true pleasure (584b-c). The only truly fulfilling pleasance is that which comes from understanding since the objects information technology pursues are permanent (585b-c). Socrates adds that just if the rational role rules the soul, will each function of the soul find its proper pleasure (586d-587a). He concludes the statement with a calculation of how many times the best life is more pleasant than the worst: seven-hundred and twenty ix (587a-587e). Socrates discusses an imaginary multi-headed fauna to illustrate the consequences of justice and injustice in the soul and to back up justice (588c ff.).

j. Volume X

Thereafter, Socrates returns to the subject field of poesy and claims that the measures introduced to exclude imitative poetry from the just city seem clearly justified now (595a). Poetry is to be censored since the poets may non know which is; thus may atomic number 82 the soul astray (595b). Socrates proceeds to hash out imitation. He explains what it is by distinguishing several levels of imitation through the case of a couch: there is the Form of the burrow, the particular couch, and a painting of a couch (596a-598b). The products of imitation are far removed from the truth (597e-598c). Poets, like painters are imitators who produce imitations without knowledge of the truth (598e-599a). Socrates argues that if poets had knowledge of the truth they would desire to exist people who exercise great things rather than remain poets (599b). Socrates doubts the poet's capacity to teach virtue since he only imitates images of it (599c-601a). The poet's knowledge is inferior to that of the maker of other products and the maker'southward knowledge is junior to that of the user's (601c-602b).

Now Socrates considers how imitators affect their audiences (602c). He uses a comparison with optical illusions (602c) to argue that imitative poesy causes the parts of the soul to be at war with each other and this leads to injustice (603c-605b). The most serious accuse confronting imitative poetry is that information technology even corrupts decent people (605c). He concludes that the just city should not allow such poesy in information technology but but poetry that praises the gods and good humans (606e-607a). Imitative poesy prevents the immortal soul from attaining its greatest reward (608c-d).

Glaucon wonders if the soul is immortal and Socrates launches into an statement proving its immortality: things that are destroyed, are destroyed by their own evil; the body's evil is illness and this can destroy information technology; the soul'south evils are ignorance, injustice and the other vices but these do not destroy the soul; thus, the soul is immortal (608d-611a). Socrates points out that we cannot empathize the nature of the soul if nosotros only consider its relation to the body equally the nowadays discussion has (611b-d).

Socrates finally describes the rewards of justice by first having Glaucon allow that he can discuss the rewards of reputation for justice (612b-d). Glaucon allows this since Socrates has already defended justice past itself in the soul. Socrates indicates justice and injustice do not escape the notice of the gods, that the gods love the just and hate the unjust, and that good things come to those whom the gods love (612e-613a). Socrates lists various rewards for the merely and punishments for the unjust in this life (613a-e). He proceeds to tell the Myth of Er that is supposed to illustrate advantage and punishment in the afterlife (614b). The souls of the expressionless go up through an opening on the right if they were but, or below through an opening on the left if they were unjust (614d). The various souls hash out their rewards and punishments (614e-615a). Socrates explains the multiples past which people are punished and rewarded (615a-b). The souls of the dead are able to choose their adjacent lives (617d) and then they are reincarnated (620e). Socrates ends the discussion past prompting Glaucon and the others to practice well both in this life and in the afterlife (621c-d).

ii. Ethics or Political Philosophy?

The Republic has acquired the recognition of a archetype and seminal work in political philosophy. It is often taught in courses that focus on political theory or political philosophy. Moreover, in the dialogue Socrates seems primarily concerned with what is an upstanding outcome, namely whether the just life is better than the unjust life for the individual. These ii observations heighten 2 issues. The first is whether the Democracy is primarily about ethics or about politics. If information technology is primarily about ideals then maybe its recognition as a seminal political work is unwarranted. Moreover, considering it a political work would exist somewhat mistaken. The second consequence is that even if thinking of it as a classic in political philosophy is warranted, it is very difficult to situate it in terms of its political position.

Interpreters of the Republic take presented various arguments concerning the issue of whether the dialogue is primarily near ethics or almost politics. As is axiomatic from Books I and Two, Socrates' chief aim in the dialogue is to evidence that the just person is better off than the unjust person. In Book II, he proposes to construct the but city in speech in club to find justice in it and then to proceed to find justice in the individual (368a). Thus, he seems to employ a word in political matters as a means by which to answer what is essentially an upstanding question. But, Socrates also spends a lot of time in the dialogue on political matters in relation to the question of political justice such as education, the positions and relations among political classes, war, property, the causes of political strife and change of regimes, and several other matters. Each of these could provide important contributions to political philosophy.

1 argument, suggesting that the dialogue is primarily concerned with the ethical question, focuses on Socrates' presentation of the political discussion of justice as instrumental to discovering justice in the individual. Some other relevant consideration is that there are several indications in the dialogue that the aim in the give-and-take is more pressing than the ways (the simply city). Thus, the argument goes, Socrates does not seem primarily interested in discussing political philosophy just ethics instead. Some other related statement indicates that the discussion entails great doubts about whether the just city is fifty-fifty possible. Socrates claims this along with the idea that the function of the just metropolis in the argument is to enable the private to get a better thought of justice and injustice (472b-d, 592a-b). Thus, it is very difficult for us to conclude that Socrates takes the political discussion every bit seriously as he does the moral question (encounter Annas, Julia. Ideal Ideals, Old and New).

Other interpreters bespeak that the Democracy is substantially virtually both ethics and politics (among others see Santas, Gerasimos. Understanding Plato's Republic; Schofield, Malcolm. Plato: Political Philosophy; Reeve C.D.C. Philosopher Kings). Some emphasize that many of Socrates' proposals for social reform (education, holding, the role of women, the family) go beyond what is needed to be able to debate that the only person is better off than the unjust person. Thus, these social reforms seem to exist developed for their own sake.

Some indicate that Socrates' word of political matters is meant, in office, to provide us with Plato's critique of Greek political life. In Volume 8 he criticizes democracy as an unjust regime and thus he seems to launch a critique against Athenian commonwealth. He also adopts several measures in the just metropolis, which were part of the Spartan constitution. Like Spartan citizens, the guardians of the just city are professional soldiers whose aim is the protection of the city, the guardians eat together, and they have their needs provided for by other classes. Only different Sparta, the just city has philosophers as rulers, a rigorous arrangement of educational activity in intellectual matters, and it is not timocratic or honour loving. These differences may be construed as a critique of Sparta's political life. Thus, the statement suggests, in addition to the master ethical question the dialogue is also about political philosophy.

Another position is that even though the discussion of political matters is instrumental to addressing the main upstanding question of the dialogue, Socrates makes several important contributions to political philosophy. One such contribution is his clarification of political regimes in Volume VIII and his classification of them on a scale of more or less just. Another such contribution is his consideration of the causes of political change from one political regime to some other. Moreover, Socrates seems to raise and address a number of questions that seem necessary in order to sympathize political life clearly. He raises the issues of the office of women in the urban center, the role of the family, the role of art, the upshot of class relations, of political stability, of the limitation of people's freedoms and several others. Thus, according to this view, it is warranted to regard the Republic every bit a piece of work on political philosophy and as a seminal work in that expanse.

A further relevant consideration has to practise with how one understands the nature of ideals and political philosophy and their relation. Since modernity, it becomes much easier to treat these as separate subjects. Mod ideals is more focused on determining whether an activeness is morally permissible or not whereas ancient ethics is more focused on happiness or the adept life. Many ancient thinkers want to address the question "what is the happy life?" and in lodge to exercise this they think that it is warranted to accost political matters. Humans live their lives in political communities and the kind of political customs they live in tin be conducive or detrimental to ane'due south happiness. Thus, ideals and political philosophy are more closely linked for ancient thinkers than they may be for us since modernity. Ethics and political philosophy seem to exist unlike sides of the same money.

The second issue has to do with situating the Commonwealth'south political stance. There are several competing candidates. The Republic entails elements of socialism as when Socrates expresses the desire to accomplish happiness for the whole city not for any particular grouping of it (420b) and when he argues against inequalities in wealth (421d). At that place are as well elements of fascism or totalitarianism. Amid others, there is farthermost censorship of poetry, lying to maintain practiced behavior and political stability, restriction of power to a pocket-sized elite group, eugenic techniques, centralized command of the denizen'due south lives, a strong military group that enforces the laws, and suppression of freedom of expression and choice. Several commentators focused on these elements to dismiss the Democracy as a proto-totalitarian text (see Popper, Karl. The Open Social club and Its Enemies). At that place are too some strong elements of communism such as the thought that the guardian form ought to possess things in common. Despite, Socrates' accent on the individual and the condition of his soul, the Republic does not entail the kernels of what becomes modernistic liberalism. Socrates seems to argue confronting allowing much freedom to individuals and to criticize the democratic tendency to treat humans as equals. Some accept argued that the Republic is neither a precursor of these political positions nor does it fit any of them. They notice that the Republic has been such a seminal work in the history of political philosophy precisely because it raises such issues as its political opinion while discussing many of the features of such political positions.

3. The Analogy of the City and the Soul

The analogy of the city and the soul, is Socrates proposed and accepted method past which to contend that the merely person is better off than the unjust person (Book Two, 368c-369a). If Socrates is able to show how a just metropolis is always happier than unjust cities, and so he can take a model by which to fence that a just person is always happier than an unjust one. He plausibly assumes that there is an interesting, intelligible, and non-adventitious relation between the structural features and values of a city and an individual. But commentators have constitute this curious approach one of the virtually puzzling features of the Democracy. The city/soul analogy is quite puzzling since Socrates seems to apply it in different ways, thus at that place is much controversy nearly the exact extent of the illustration. Moreover, there is much controversy concerning its usefulness in the attempt to detect and to defend justice in terms of the individual.

In several passages Socrates seems to say that the same business relationship of justice must utilise to both cities (justice is the right social club of classes) and to individuals (justice is the right order of the soul). But even though he says this he seems to think that this ought to exist the case for unlike reasons. For example, at (435a), he seems to say that the same account of justice ought to apply to the city and to the individual since the same business relationship of whatever predicate X must apply to all things that are X. So, if a urban center or an individual is just then the same predicates must apply to both. In other passages Socrates seems to mean that same account of justice ought to apply to the urban center and to the private since the X-ness of the whole is due to the X-ness of the parts (435d). And then, if the people in the city are just, so this will cause the city to exist just besides. Yet notwithstanding in other passages he seems to say that if a city is only and this causes it to have certain features such equally wisdom or backbone, then we can deduce that the individual'due south being just will also crusade him to be wise and mettlesome. And then if a city's X-ness entails certain predicates, then the individual'due south 10-ness must entail the same predicates. In other passages still, he seems to merits that the justice of the city tin exist used as a heuristic device by which to expect for justice in the private, thus the relation between the two seems quite loose (368e-369a). (For a thorough word of these issues and the diverse interpretations of the city/soul analogy see Ferrari, G.R.F. City and Soul in Plato'due south Republic.)

four. Plato's Defence of Justice

In response to Thrasymachus, Glaucon, and Adeimantus, Socrates seeks to show that information technology is ever in an individual's interest to be just, rather than unjust. Thus, i of the most pressing issues regarding the Republic is whether Socrates defends justice successfully or not. David Sachs, in his influential article "A Fallacy in Plato's Republic", argues that Socrates' defense of justice entails a crucial problem which renders the defense problematic. Sachs argues that Socrates commits the fallacy of irrelevance. Socrates sets out to defend the idea that it is always in 1'due south interest to be just and to human action justly and he presents the only person as one who has a balanced soul. Sachs observes that what Socrates defends is psychic health or rationality which may pb one to be happy but he fails to defend justice. Socrates fails to show why having a balanced soul will pb one to act justly or why psychic health amounts to justice. Sachs implies that justice, as this is traditionally understood, includes actions in relation to others, it includes considerations of other people's good, and also includes strong motivations not to act unjustly. According to Sachs, Socrates' defense of justice does not include compelling reasons to call up that a person with a balanced soul will refrain from acts that are traditionally thought to be unjust such as say, theft, murder, or adultery. Thus, Plato presents Socrates defending psychic wellness rather than justice.

Sachs' critique indicates that equally Socrates presents the just person, the person's counterbalanced soul does not entail a sufficient causal or logical connection to performing socially simply actions. In order to relieve Socrates' defense of justice one needs to show that there is a logical and a causal connection betwixt having a balanced soul and performing socially just actions. Otherwise, the problem of beingness psychically just just socially unjust remains

Given Sachs' critique, several commentators accept come up to Socrates' defense to bridge the gap between a just soul and simply actions (these are discussed in item past Singpurwalla, Rachel One thousand. K. "Plato's Defense of Justice in the Republic"). I approach to bridging the gap between a simply soul and but deportment has been to show that the just person with a counterbalanced soul operates according to certain values and desires which cannot atomic number 82 to unjust actions (see Kraut, Richard "The Defense of Justice in Plato'south Commonwealth"). The just person'south soul entails desires for certain kinds of objects the most important of which is noesis. Socrates indicates the difficulty and extreme effort required to achieve noesis of the forms and the course of the Good, thus the just person volition pursue learning and not spend time indulging in the satisfaction of desires that typically atomic number 82 to unjust actions. This approach of bridging the gap between a just soul and just actions may have some drawbacks. I drawback may be that several unjust actions may be motivated past desires that are compatible with the desire for noesis. For instance, why wouldn't a person with a great want for knowledge steal a book if this would contribute to his cognition.

A second arroyo to bridging the gap between the simply soul and just deportment has been to bear witness that the just person's noesis of the good, directly motivates him to perform just actions and to refrain from unjust ones (come across Cooper, John "The Psychology of Justice in Plato's Republic" and White, N. A Companion to Plato's Republic). A crucial piece of prove for this approach is Socrates' presentation of the philosopher who agrees to rule the urban center even though this will interfere with his want to learn. The proponents of this arroyo argue that the philosopher agrees to rule since his knowledge of the skilful directly motivates him to act confronting his interests and to practice something that is skillful considerately and for others. This approach has met at least one serious objection: the just person's knowledge of the good may motivate him to do what is good for others but Socrates seeks to also contend that it is always in ane's involvement to exist only, thus this approach may advise that just deportment may non always be in the just person's interests (for a discussion of this see Singpurwalla). This objection amounts to the merits that the 2d approach may testify that the just person will do simply actions but information technology does this by sacrificing Socrates' claim that existence just is always in ane's involvement.

Given the problems of the first two approaches, a third one attempts to testify that the merely person will do what is just in relation to others while at the same time doing what is in the just person's interests. In other words, this approach seeks to evidence that the but person's own good is realized in doing what is also adept for others. According to this approach, the merely person has a value that motivates him to do what is just, in relation to others and this value is the merely person's love of the forms (see Dahl, Norman "Plato'south Defense of Justice"). The just person'due south dear of the forms is the desire to contemplate and also imitate or instantiate these in the world. Thus, the philosopher regards ruling as something in his interest despite the fact that it interferes with his pursuit of knowledge, since in ruling he will exist imitating the forms. Even though this approach seems to bridge the gap between the just person and just actions and the gap between just actions and such actions being in the just person'south interest (this was the problem with the second approach) a criticism remains. Singpurwalla points out that only very few people can learn such knowledge of the forms and then as to be just persons, thus for nigh people Socrates offers no good reason to be just. This third approach may salvage Socrates' defense force of justice but for people capable of knowing the forms, only falls short of showing that everyone has a reason to be but.

Singpurwalla suggests a fourth approach which tin can defend Socrates contra Sachs and which volition avoid the criticisms launched against the other approaches. She aims to show that Socrates has a skillful reason to think that information technology is in everyone'southward interest to human action justly considering doing and so satisfies a securely ingrained human need, namely, the need to be unified with others. Singpurwalla attempts to make her case by showing the following: (ane) that co-ordinate to Socrates our happiness largely resides in existence unified with others (she cites the tyrant's unhappiness due to bad relations with others every bit prove for this, 567a-580a); (ii) that being unified with others entails considering their own good when nosotros act (she cites Socrates' claims that when people are unified they share in each other'south pleasures and successes and failures as evidence for this, 462b-e, 463e-464d); (3) thus, behaving unjustly, which involves disregarding another's good, is incompatible with being unified with others and with our happiness. Singpurwalla'southward position tries to show that even though the average person may non be able to attain the noesis of the form of the good, he can still exist motivated to human action justly since this is in his interest. Thus, Socrates' defense of justice may be compelling for the philosopher every bit well every bit the average person.

v. References and Farther Reading

a. Standard Greek Text

Slings, S.R. (ed.),Platonis Rempublicam (Oxford: Oxford Classical Texts, 2003).

b. English Translations

Shorey, Paul.Plato. Commonwealth (2 vols. Loeb, 137-1937). This translation includes an introduction and notes.
Bloom, Allan.The Commonwealth of Plato. (New York: Basic Books, 1968). This translation includes notes and an interpretative essay.
Ferrari, One thousand.R.F. (ed.), Griffith, Tom (trans.).Plato. The Republic. (Cambridge: Cambridge Academy Press, 2000). This translation includes an introduction.
Reeve, C.D.C.Plato. The Republic. (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2004).

c. General Discussions of the Republic

(all attempt to provide a unified estimation of the dialogue).

Murphy, North.R.The Interpretation of Plato's Republic (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1951).
Cantankerous, R.C. and Woozley, A.D.Plato's Republic: A Philosophical Commentary (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1964).
White, Nicholas P.A Companion to Plato'southward Republic (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1979).
Annas, Julia.An Introduction to Plato's Republic (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981).
Reeve, C.D.C.Philosopher Kings: The Argument of Plato's Commonwealth (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988).
Howland, Jacob.The Commonwealth: The Odyssey of Philosophy (Philadelphia: Paul Dry out Books, 2004).
Rosen, Stanley.Plato's Republic: A Study (New Haven: Yale University Printing, 2005).
Santas, Gerasimos.Understanding Plato'south Democracy (Wiley-Blackwell, 2010).

d. Discussions on Plato'south Ethics and Political Philosophy

(all entail a systematic discussion of ethics and/or political philosophy in theRepublic).

Irwin, T.H.Plato's Ideals (Oxford: Oxford Academy Printing, 1995).
Annas, Julia.Platonic Ethics Quondam and New (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999).
Monoson, Sara.Plato'southward Democratic Entanglements (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000).
Bobonich, Christopher.Plato'southward Utopia Recast (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).
Schofield, Malcolm.Plato: Political Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).
Rowe, Christopher. "The Place of theDemocracy in Plato'south Political Thought" in Ferrari, G.R.F.The Canbridge Companion to Plato'southward Republic. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

e. Discussions on the City/Soul Analogy.

Williams, Bernard. "The Analogy of Urban center and Soul in Plato's Republic", in Kraut, Richard (ed.).Plato's Republic: Critical Essays (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 1997).
Lear, Jonathan. "Within and Outside theCommonwealth", in Kraut, Richard (ed.).Plato'south Republic: Critical Essays (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 1997).
Ferrari, Grand.R.F.City and Soul in Plato'due south Democracy (Chicago: The Academy of Chicago Press, 2005).
Blossner, Norbert. "The City-Soul Analogy", in Ferrari, G.R.F.The Canbridge Companion to Plato'south Democracy. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

f. Discussions of Plato's Defence of Justice in the Republic

(in chronological order; these essays discuss how Socrates defends justice and examine how well he does in doing so).

Sachs, David. "A Fallacy in Plato'sRepublic", inThe Philosophical Review 72 (1963): 141-58.
Dahl, Norman O. "Plato's Defense of Justice", inPhilosophy and Phenomenological Enquiry. Vol. 51, No. 4 (December. 1991).
Kraut, Richard. "The Defence force of Justice in Plato'sCommonwealth", in Kraut, Richard (ed.)Plato's Republic: Critical Essays (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 1997).
Singpurwalla, Rachel G.Thousand. "Plato'due south Defense of Justice in theCommonwealth", in Santas, Gerasimos (ed.).The Blackwell Guide to Plato's Republic (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2006).

1000. Discussions of Political Measures Introduced in the Merely City

i. Discussions of the Function of Women in the Just City

Discussions of the Role of Women in the Just City
Vlastos, Gregory. "Was Plato a Feminist?",Times Literary Supplement, No. 4, 485, Mar. 17, 1989, 276, 288-89.
Saxonhouse, Arlene. "The philosopher and the Female in the Political Thought of Plato", in Kraut, Richard (ed.)Plato's Republic: Critical Essays (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 1997).
Reeve. C.D.C. "The Naked Old Women in the Palaestra", in Kraut, Richard (ed.)Plato's Republic: Critical Essays (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 1997).

ii. Discussions of Poetry in the Just City

Urmson, James O. "Plato and the Poets", in Kraut, Richard (ed.)Plato's Commonwealth: Critical Essays (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 1997).
O'Connor, David K. "Rewriting the Poets in Plato'south Characters", in Ferrari, G.R.F.The Canbridge Companion to Plato's Republic. (Cambridge: Cambridge Academy Printing, 2007).
Moss, Jessica. "What is Imitative Poetry and Why is it Bad?", in Ferrari, G.R.F.The Canbridge Companion to Plato'due south Commonwealth. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

three. Discussions on the Soul in the Republic

Lorenz, Hendrik. "The Analysis of the Soul in Plato'southwardRepublic" in Santas, Gerasimos (ed.).The Blackwell Guide to Plato's Republic (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2006).
Ferrari, G.R.F., "The Three-Part Soul", in Ferrari, K.R.F.The Cambridge Companion to Plato's Republic. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

four. Discussions on Plato's Moral Psychology in the Republic

Cooper, John M. "The Psychology of Justice in Plato" in Kraut, Richard (ed.)Plato's Republic: Critical Essays (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 1997).
Anagnostopoulos, Mariana. "The Divided Soul and the Want for Skilful in Plato'due southDemocracy" in Santas, Gerasimos (ed.).The Blackwell Guide to Plato's Commonwealth (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2006).

Writer Data

Antonis Coumoundouros
Electronic mail: acoumoundouros@adrian.edu
Adrian College
U. Due south. A.

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Source: https://iep.utm.edu/republic/

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